ACHIEVING ATT UNIVERSALIZATION IN AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

African countries have been some of the strongest proponents of a robust and impactful Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Almost all of the countries on the continent voted for the Treaty’s adoption on 2 April 2013,¹ and ten were amongst the first to sign the Treaty at its opening for signature.² This high level of political engagement with the ATT throughout the negotiation process reflects the fact that for decades, many countries in Africa have been disproportionately impacted by the poorly regulated arms trade.
Despite this, the number of States Parties from Africa is still relatively low two years after the ATT opened for signature. This paper examines the obstacles that are facing some of the countries in Africa who are yet to become States Parties to the ATT. It provides an overview of the Treaty’s status across the continent, and features six case studies that investigate specific barriers, actual or perceived, that have hindered membership. These are representative of some of the broad challenges that countries face both in Africa and elsewhere.

Research for this paper was based on interviews with representatives of government and civil society within case study countries. It was supplemented by findings from bilateral advocacy, national statements during meetings of the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and the first Conference of States Parties to the ATT, as well as Control Arms’ ongoing dialogue with African partners and governments.

The status of the ATT in Africa

As of 22 August 2016 there are 19 African States Parties to the ATT, including two accessions. Another 20 African countries are Signatories to the Treaty. Just over a third (35 per cent) of the 54 countries in Africa are States Parties to the ATT, and 72 per cent sit within the Treaty regime.

African States Parties formed the majority of new members to the ATT in the last year (nine out of 16 new States Parties in 2015).

However, while the Treaty status in Africa is far better than in, for example, Asia Pacific (where only three countries out of 54 are full States Parties), it falls below the membership rate in other UN regional groupings (see Figure 1).
Within Africa there are significant sub-regional differences in engagement with the ATT (see Figure 2). Membership is strongest in West Africa, where 11 of the 15 countries in the sub-region are State Party to the ATT and four more are Signatories. In the sub-region only Gambia stood outside the Treaty regime as of 31 July 2016. Through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), countries in the sub-region have a long history of collective action to tackle the proliferation and abuse of weapons – especially small arms. The 2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons has particularly assisted the rapid rate of ratification of the ATT among West African countries.\(^6\)

In other sub-regions universalization efforts have been slower and more uneven. In North Africa, only Mauritania is a State Party, and only Libya is a Signatory to the Treaty. Of the 14 countries in Eastern Africa only Seychelles is a State Party so far. Unlike in other regions, arms control efforts in Eastern Africa are led by a dedicated organization rather than a regional economic integration entity such as ECOWAS,\(^7\) and countries in Eastern Africa are likely to require sustained cooperation and assistance efforts to ensure that arms control initiatives are effective.\(^8\) Membership is higher in both Central and Southern Africa, but there are still many countries either yet to sign or become full States Party to the ATT.

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**Figure 1: Status of the ATT among UN regional groupings\(^5\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Grouping</th>
<th>Number of UN member states</th>
<th>States Parties to the ATT (as of 22 August 2016)</th>
<th>Percentage of countries who are States Parties</th>
<th>Percentage of countries who are States Parties or Signatories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe and others (WEOG)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What is preventing non-States Parties in Africa from joining, or fully implementing the ATT? While each country faces its own unique set of challenges, distinctive to its political, cultural, security and economic position, some common themes are evident.

1. **Prioritisation (Political):** Although there is support for the ATT, joining it not a matter of high priority. Other issues such as upcoming or recent elections, take precedence
2. **Prioritisation (Crisis):** Violence, instability or another crisis slows or stops efforts to ratify the ATT
3. **Technical:** There are specific concerns about being able to properly implement the Treaty
4. **Capacity:** Key decision-makers do not know much about the ATT and there is a knowledge gap or critical misconceptions about the Treaty’s purpose and benefits
5. **Procedural:** Joining the ATT is slowed as a result of national political procedure, such as the need to complete related processes, or the need to coordinate multiple national stakeholders
6. **Reticence:** There is hostility, scepticism, or reticence towards joining the ATT.

This report investigates the experience of six African countries who have yet to become States Parties – Botswana, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Kenya and Uganda – in order to illustrate each of these obstacles in greater detail. Of course, countries may feature more than one of the themes below – they are listed according to the thematic issues, which appear to be the dominant reason for non-ratification.

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**Figure 2: Sub-regional universalization status in Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-region</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>States Parties</th>
<th>Signatories</th>
<th>Percentage of countries who are States Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Prioritisation (Political): Botswana

Many of the countries still to join the ATT face prioritisation challenges. These challenges can be the result of elections that lead to changing personnel and policy goals—as in Botswana—or because a country does not consider ratifying the ATT to be a pressing need at this time.

Countries in Africa where this is a current obstacle appear to include:

- Angola
- Botswana
- Cape Verde
- Equatorial Guinea
- Gambia
- Mozambique
- Swaziland
- Zimbabwe

**BOTSWANA** is not a signatory to the ATT, but has expressed strong support for it and was among the governments that voted for its adoption in 2013.\(^{10}\) Statements made subsequently have welcomed the Treaty’s entry into force and indicated the country’s intention to accede.\(^{11}\) Botswana’s 2016 report to the UN Programme of Action (UN PoA) shows that the government has put in place policies and practices to curb the illicit transfer of arms and is known to have some of the strictest domestic firearms control legislation on the continent.\(^{12}\) Their statements regularly express strong concern regarding the proliferation of SALW across Africa.

Informal discussions indicate that a key reason why the country has not acceded is one of priority, stemming largely from elections that took place in October 2014. Although the same party was returned to power a new opposition coalition was formed and individuals responsible for overseeing accession have moved into different posts. This has led to a review of various international agreements under consideration.\(^{13}\) There is a good knowledge about the ATT among officials and a strong foundation for implementation from prior work implementing the UN PoA and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on the Control of Illicit Firearms, Ammunitions and Other Related Materials.\(^{14}\) It is not exactly clear when accession could happen but as there do not appear to be significant barriers, the outlook is very positive.

**Tackling prioritisation (political):**

Prioritisation issues in general are typically short-term obstacles for States looking to join the ATT. In many cases these challenges can be addressed by coordinated encouragement and support from States Parties and civil society to ensure that the benefits and necessity of rapid ratification are made clear.
Recommendations:

• Civil society has an important role to play in continuing to raise the priority of the ATT within their national context, as well as to help fill informational gaps and point out the relevance and benefits to joining. This can be accomplished through research, media, briefings and meetings.

2. Prioritisation (Crisis): Burundi

Priority challenges can also be the result of emerging internal or external crises that risk destabilising the government, and refocus all political efforts, such as an outbreak of armed violence. Arguably, the ATT could help prevent the very crises that are currently stopping some countries in Africa from joining the Treaty.

Countries where this is currently the issue include

• Burundi
• Libya
• Somalia
• South Sudan

BURUNDI became a Signatory to the ATT at the first opportunity on 3 July 2013. It has been a vocal proponent of the Treaty’s aims and objectives, specifically referencing how the ATT will address the problem of the cross-border smuggling of arms. Burundi has also spoken in favour of the Treaty’s benefits through reducing armed conflict, displacement, transnational organized crime and terrorism, and strengthening peace and sustainable development.

Unfortunately, the political situation in Burundi has changed dramatically since it signed the ATT. In April 2015 civil unrest broke out when President Pierre Nkurunziza decided to seek a third term in office, which sparked opposition and protest. He succeeded in gaining a third term in July 2015, prolonging protest. More than 400 people have been killed and 200,000 have fled their homes.

Incidents of sexual and...
gender based violence, which reportedly have an ethnic dimension, are a further worrying development. Human rights groups and the United Nations have expressed alarm about the response from the government to protesters, particularly with respect to torture, and this may be having an impact on national attitudes toward international agreements or institutions. The recent security crisis has crowded out other political priorities in Burundi, including completing the process of ratifying the ATT.

Positively, much has been done to keep the issue on the parliamentary agenda and improve understanding about the ATT among decision-makers. The Centre d’Encadrement et de Développement des Anciens Combattants, Action on Armed Violence and the International Committee of the Red Cross have been the most active from among civil society in continuing to advance the ATT from among civil society. In one example, a three-day training on the ATT in June 2014 brought together parliamentarians, government representatives and civil society from Burundi as well as neighbouring Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Additional advocacy and outreach have continued since, despite the severe security challenges in the country. The Burundian National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons, as well the Legal Advisor to the Military, are participating in the ATT Academy, a six month training programme organized by Control Arms and Pace University. Despite the delay, it is hoped that Burundi will complete its ratification over the next several months.

Tackling prioritisation challenges:
When it is a situation of crisis or conflict, finding ways to move ATT accession or ratification forward are very difficult. The capacity of a government to take decisions and function could be impacted and other decisions become more urgent.

Recommendations:
• Identifying the linkages between the ATT and the crisis, which often have an arms dimension, is important. This can demonstrate the utility of the ATT for the country or sub-region.
• Keeping a few key actors informed about the Treaty could have long term value as once the crisis has ended, they will be positioned to move accession or ratification forward.

3. Technical: Democratic Republic of the Congo

The DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC) is an example of the countries that face technical barriers to joining the ATT; where there is concern about a specific requirement of membership to the ATT and the country’s ability to meet Treaty standards.
Countries that appear to face technical challenges include:

- Benin
- DRC
- Namibia

The DRC voted in favour of the ATT and participated in the negotiation process, but has not yet signed the Treaty.\textsuperscript{23}

The complicating factor for the DRC is that the country is currently under a UN Security Council arms embargo as a result of the high levels of armed violence occurring within its borders.\textsuperscript{24} Violations of human rights and international law by armed groups and militias are widespread throughout the country. The Security Council has reported on targeted attacks and forced displacement of civilians, recruitment of child soldiers, sexual and gender-based violence, extrajudicial executions and arbitrary arrests.\textsuperscript{25} The risk of diversion to these groups is extremely high, as is the risk that these weapons are likely to be used for serious human rights abuses or war crimes in the DRC.\textsuperscript{26}

Arms embargoes are among the absolute prohibitions listed in Article 6 of the ATT, meaning that if a country is under an embargo then the transfer shall not be authorized.\textsuperscript{27} As a senior military official in the DRC explained, the embargo generates questions and scrutiny from the Security Council, which does not facilitate willingness within the DRC to move ahead with the ATT. There is a fear that even if the DRC does accede the attitude of the international community towards the country will not change.\textsuperscript{28} Embargoes are often viewed as problematic and having limited effect but can have a positive impact in forcing affected states and their neighbours to update their control systems.\textsuperscript{29}

To reduce the risk of diversion and improve accountability and control over its stockpiles the government has put into place a large-scale marking and tracing programme. DRC officials are entering the first stages of a five-year plan. Marking and tracing are important tools for identifying a weapon, its origins and transfer history in order to determine its illicit manufacture or find those responsible for an illegal shipment or misappropriation. A senior military official interviewed felt that these improvements are key to having sanctions and embargoes lifted and that it is important to have them in place before acceding to the ATT so as to be able to implement their commitments.\textsuperscript{30}

**Tackling Technical Challenges**

There is already a wide range of ongoing ‘ATT-relevant’ and ‘ATT-focused’ assistance and cooperation activities in sub-Saharan Africa that can support States to manage and address implementation challenges.\textsuperscript{31} The different regional economic communities in Africa are particularly important providers of assistance, especially focused on SALW controls. Other key providers of technical implementation support include the EU-ATT Outreach Project and the UN Trust
Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR). Civil society can also play an important role in the provision of expert assistance to States working to overcome technical barriers to ATT membership.

Recommendations:

• Technical concerns or delays can be addressed by looking to the experiences of other countries, particularly neighbouring countries or those in other regions, for information and examples.
• ATT States Parties with relevant technical expertise and other resources that can assist in overcoming universalization challenges are encouraged to proactively support and share information.

4. Capacity: DRC

DRC is also representative of another important thematic challenge – lack of awareness and information about the ATT among government and parliamentarians. Countries that appear to face this challenge in Africa include:

• Algeria
• Cape Verde
• DRC
• Djibouti
• Gabon
• Sao Tome and Principe

In the DRC there is a limited understanding among some relevant political leaders of the potential benefits of the ATT in helping to control weapons’ proliferation and reducing human suffering in the country. Regular provision of credible, accurate information is needed to help inform decision-makers of how the ATT can help the DRC and what would be needed to effectively implement the Treaty in the country.

This has been occurring to some extent, through activities organized by civil society and bilateral outreach from informed government and military members. A coalition of organizations – Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, Vision GRAM and Femmes des Medias pour la Justice du Congo undertook a multi-faceted project in the first half of 2016 to advocate...
for ATT accession. They were successful in getting the ATT onto the agenda of the National Assembly in its March-May session where it was considered. This is a positive first step but the outreach and engagement must continue, in tandem with the practical steps like the marking and tracing programme to ensure not only accession but effective implementation.

Tackling Capacity Challenges
The case of the DRC demonstrates the need to develop a proactive and practical response in order to address this challenge in advance of acceding. Information issues are common in countries in many global regions where there are limited diplomatic resources or where there has been a high turnover of staff. In countries like Algeria, Cape Verde, Djibouti, and Sao Tome and Principe, there can be a disconnect between meetings on the ATT and capital representatives. In Gabon informal discussions suggest that capacity challenges arise because not all ATT-related documents, both official and those produced by civil society, are translated into French.

Recommendations:
- States are encouraged to demonstrate their intention to join and comply with the ATT, as they may be eligible for support under the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF).
- The ATT Secretariat, States Parties and civil society should work to improve the provision of accurate and timely information on the benefits and importance of ATT ratification, and should work to ensure all relevant documents, including meeting reports and outcome documents, are translated into relevant language.

5. Procedural: Cameroon
Procedural obstacles mainly face Signatory States, who have already expressed strong support for the ATT but where the subsequent timeframe for ratification has been delayed as countries try to bring together different national stakeholders, or complete and harmonize other related processes. Countries that appear to be affected by procedural issues include:
- Cameroon
- Rwanda
- Tanzania

CAMEROON is an ATT signatory. They signed the Treaty on 3 December 2014, just before it entered into force. Civil society in Cameroon believe there are no substantive objections to the ATT among decision-makers in the country. On the contrary, the ATT is reportedly seen by many as a solution to problems caused by Boko Haram, as implementation of its provisions can limit the group's access to illicit weapons. The emergence of the
militant group over the last few years has been a significant challenge for Cameroon, as with other countries in the region. Their defence forces are reportedly already overstretched and underfunded and there are concerns about the regular army’s ability to defend against a large-scale attack by the group.\textsuperscript{35} Boko Haram is believed to have seized weapons during attacks on army bases in Cameroon, as well as Niger and Nigeria, highlighting the need to better secure stockpiles.\textsuperscript{36} This is further complicated by the actions of militants from the Central African Republic (CAR), who are taking advantage of the current focus on fighting Boko Haram in the north of the country and are making violent incursions into Cameroon’s east.\textsuperscript{37}

Given this context, Cameroon is linking the ATT ratification process with another regional instrument, the ‘Kinshasa Convention’ (the Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and all Parts and Components that can be used for their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly). Cameroon ratified the Kinshasa Convention in January 2015, Chapter VIII of which recommended the establishment of a National Commission on SALW. Civil society in Cameroon believe that the government would like for the new body to have oversight on implementing both its ATT and Kinshasa commitments and as such the two will be closely connected.\textsuperscript{38} For this reason, the obstacle or delay in Cameroon joining the ATT can be seen as largely procedural.

Going forward, the process for ratification requires presenting a bill to the Parliament for adoption. It is believed that a bill has already been drafted and that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the inter-ministerial committee in charge of drafting the bill is looking forward to the final endorsement by the Prime Minister and the Presidency to table to Parliament for adoption. In order to facilitate a swift move through Parliament, much outreach to parliamentarians and senators from civil society has occurred. The Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms, the Regional Centre on Small Arms for the Great Lake and Horn of Africa (RECSA), the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), the Cameroon Youths and Students Forum for Peace (CAMYOSFOP) and the Ecumenical Service for Peace (SeP) have been especially active. CAMYOSFOP has been organizing consultations and trainings that bring together parliamentarians, government officials, experts and civil society in order to foster more practical understanding about how the ATT and Kinshasa Convention are compatible and identify strategies to move both the establishment of the Commission and the ATT forward.\textsuperscript{39}

**Tackling Procedural Challenges**

Procedural challenges are not necessarily barriers but rather temporary delays on the road to becoming a State Party. It should also be pointed out that there is a relationship here to political priority in the sense that when something is a priority the processes and systems necessary to achieve accession or ratification can continue to move along. Inter-ministerial or agency dialogue is extremely important. The individuals that negotiated the ATT are not the same people who have a role in
its implementation. A wider group of actors may need to be engaged in order for the decision to become a State Party to be fulfilled.

Recommendations:

• Inter-ministerial or agency dialogue is extremely important. The individuals that negotiated the ATT are not the same people who have a role in its implementation. A wider group of actors may need to be engaged in order for the decision to become a State Party to be fulfilled.

• Identify the relationship between future ATT implementation and existing policies or practice that stem from other arms control agreements, and look for where there are synergies that could ease the accession or ratification process. The ATT Baseline Assessment Survey is a helpful tool in this regard.40

6. Reticence: Uganda & Kenya

The delays to Kenya and Uganda joining the ATT can best be described as political reticence, although the positions of each country to the Treaty are quite different from one another, as is their level of engagement in Treaty-related meetings and processes.

Other countries where there appear to be political obstacles include:

• Algeria
• Congo (Republic of)
• Egypt
• Eritrea
• Ethiopia
• Morocco
• Somalia
• Sudan

The degree to which this obstacle applies to each country varies considerably. For some countries there is still active distrust of the objectives of the ATT and any international arms control instrument. For others, officials are yet to be convinced of the Treaty’s impact and importance –linked to the capacity challenge identified above. Political obstacles may alternatively be because specific relevant officials or departments are reticent to join the Treaty in the immediate future until their national political context changes. This is distinct from lack of political prioritisation as it this obstacle relates more to specific positions toward the ATT.

UGANDA voted for the ATT in 2013 but has not signed it.41 It has spoken positively about the Treaty on occasion, but has not given any public indication about its plans or timeline for acceding. Civil society in Uganda believes that there is no intention to accede anytime soon and that privately, the government and military have reservations about the reporting and record-keeping requirements of the ATT and
implications for some of its transit activities to other countries in the region, such as South Sudan.\textsuperscript{42} In recent years Uganda has become one of Africa’s top three arms importers and their overall military spending has nearly doubled.\textsuperscript{43} They are a heavyweight in the region and have growing concerns about instability within its neighbouring countries. In addition, there is a growing culture of secrecy around arms procurement and the rationale behind certain procurement decisions.\textsuperscript{44} For these reasons, Uganda might be viewed as reticent towards the ATT rather than hostile, and it is hoped that this will change particularly given Uganda’s increasing military strength and importance in the sub-region.

**KENYA** was one of the seven countries that co-authored the first UN resolution that began the ATT process. The country has had an important leadership role within Africa and among other Member States for several years. It is therefore very surprising that they have not signed the Treaty they once championed. Steps in that direction were taken shortly after the Treaty opened for signature. A Cabinet Memorandum seeking cabinet approval on the ratification of the ATT was prepared and co-signed by the Office of the Attorney General and Department of Justice and the Cabinet Secretary for Interior and Coordination of National Government.\textsuperscript{45} However the Cabinet Secretary for Defence did not sign the Memo, despite being a key ministry in the implementation of the ATT. In earlier stages, the Department of Defence was not actively involved in early ATT discussions at the UN where the Kenyan delegation was led by the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, which is also responsible for SALW.\textsuperscript{46}

At present, the Kenyan MOD reportedly has two reservations; one relating to the military equipment that they manufacture and are central to the Kenyan arms industry; and the other about reporting requirements and disclosing recipients.\textsuperscript{47} Like Uganda, Kenya has resold weapons to South Sudan, which would be in violation of the ATT in the current context.\textsuperscript{48}

To move forward, an inter-ministerial committee will make a recommendation and a Memorandum for the Cabinet, after which it will go to parliament for debate and formal adoption. No timeline for this has been outlined. These differences of opinion at the political level are likely to be overcome but are the cause for delay now.
Kenyan civil society continues to advocate for accession through multi-stakeholder roundtables and media activities, as well as providing expertise and information as needed.

**Tackling Reticence Challenges**

The response of ATT States Parties and civil society to this challenge depends a lot on the nature of the State’s hesitation toward the ATT. Those with fundamental disagreement toward its content are unlikely to be convinced, at least in the short term. Those who are hesitant but not necessarily hostile toward it might be encouraged to accede or ratify through outreach, advocacy and information sharing. Sometimes, misconceptions about what the ATT is and how it works are at the root of reticence.

Recommendations:

- Outreach that helps to demystify the ATT or understand specific concerns should continue.
- States that are not party to the ATT are encouraged to participate in and maintain awareness about ATT related meetings, such as the annual Conferences of States Parties. Doing so as Observers would enable them to obtain a better understanding of the Treaty, progress on implementation and learn from the experiences of other states.

**CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Through sharing experiences and concerns there is the potential for states to learn and assist one another. Some of the obstacles identified in this paper are clearly more difficult to overcome than others and in some cases are dependent on circumstances beyond the control of policy-makers. Nonetheless, the following recommendations can help States to push beyond these universalization challenges and work towards joining the ATT.

**Prioritization (Political)**

- Civil society has an important role to play in continuing to raise the priority of the ATT within their national context, as well as help fill informational gaps and point out the relevance and benefits to joining. This can be accomplished through research, media, briefings and meetings.

**Prioritization (Crisis)**

- Identifying the linkages between the ATT and the crisis, which often have an arms dimension, is important. This can demonstrate the utility of the ATT for the country or sub-region.
- Keeping a few key actors informed about the Treaty could have long term value as once the crisis has ended, they will be positioned to move it forward.
Technical
• Technical concerns or delays can be addressed by looking to the experiences of other countries, particularly neighbouring countries or those in other regions, for information and examples.
• ATT States Parties with relevant technical expertise and other resources that can assist in overcoming universalization challenges are encouraged to proactively support and share information.

Capacity
• States are encouraged to demonstrate their intention to join and comply with the ATT, as they may be eligible for support under the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF).
• Provision of accurate and timely information on the benefits and importance of ATT ratification should be provided.

Procedural
• Inter-ministerial or agency dialogue is extremely important. The individuals that negotiated the ATT are not the same people who have a role in its implementation. A wider group of actors may need to be engaged in order for the decision to become a State Party to be fulfilled.
• Identify the relationship between future ATT implementation and existing policies or practice that stem from other arms control agreements, and look for where there are synergies that could ease the accession or ratification process. The ATT Baseline Assessment Survey is a helpful tool in this regard.

Reticence
• States Parties, the ATT Secretariat and civil society should conduct outreach that helps to demystify the ATT or understand specific concerns.
• States that are not party to the ATT are encouraged to participate in and maintain awareness about ATT related meetings, such as the annual Conferences of States Parties. Doing so as Observers would enable them to obtain a better understanding of the Treaty, progress on implementation and learn from the experiences of other states.

This paper forms the basis of an assistance identification methodology that Control Arms could extend to other regions where ATT membership is low such as ATT-Pacific. It is hoped that this attempt to map and identify some of the thematic obstacles facing States in Africa that are trying to ratify the ATT will improve access to assistance and cooperation support.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Control Arms wishes to thank the Government of New Zealand for its funding towards the development of this report.
**END NOTES**

1. 49 of 54 countries in Africa were present for the vote, of which 47 voted Yes and the other two abstained.


3. The Treaty will enter into force for the most recent ratifying country, Zambia, on 21 August 2016, the day before the Conference begins.


5. Based on the regional groupings used by United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). Asia-Pacific includes countries in the Middle East, in Asia, and in the Pacific regions.


7. The Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA). https://recsasec.org


9. Data for this graphic is based on the subregional offices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. See http://www.uneca.org/subregional-offices


22. Interviews with Eric Niragira of the Centre d’Encadrement et de Développement des Anciens Combattants (CEDAC) in August 2016 and discussion during the first ATT Academy training session in June 2016.
34. Interview with Eugene Ngalim, Executive Director, Cameroon Youths and Students Forum for Peace (CAMYOSFOP) 3 August 2016.
38. Interview with Eugene Ngalim, Executive Director, Cameroon Youths and Students Forum for Peace (CAMYOSFOP) 3 August 2016.
40. ATT Baseline Assessment Project (ATT-BAP). http://www.armstrade.info/
42. Telephone interview with Ugandan civil society representative, 5 August 2016
45 Email interview with Ministry of Interior staff, 11 August 2016.
46 Skype interview with representatives of Kenyan civil society, 3 August 2016.
47 Ibid.