FOURTH CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES TO THE ARMS TRADE TREATY
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IMPLEMENTATION: DIVERSION

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Preventing diversion is central to the ATT’s objectives and obligations, particularly in Article 11. We welcome the decision to make diversion a major theme of CSP 2018, and the constructive intersessional meetings over the last year, particularly in the Diversion sub-group of the WGETI, but also in the WGTR. We hope that their Chairs’ Reports to CSP 2018 are welcomed and endorsed as a basis for intersessional work over the next year.

It is important that this intersessional work intensifies, and mobilises increased action, resources and co-operation to prevent and combat diversion at all stages of the transfer chain and arms lifecycle. This includes pre-shipment holdings; international transportation to the authorised destination; delivery to the authorised end-user; stockpile management and security by authorised end-user; arms management during operations; possible re-export; and arms disposal processes.

There is wide evidence in almost all regions of diversion during each of these stages. We thus welcome proposals for an early start after this CSP of working group sessions for detailed information-sharing on real-world risk-assessments and experiences of diversion, and on lessons learned for prevention or mitigation measures.

These exchanges need to be systematic; examining the distinctive diversion risks and experiences relating to each stage of the life cycle of transferred arms, and the roles and responsibilities of relevant actors including export, transit and import control authorities and agencies, private sector actors, and others. These meetings should be open to all stakeholders. Civil society groups and experts have much to contribute to such information sharing, based on many years of experience, information collection and research.

These intersessional discussions need to go beyond lesson-learning and clarification of good practices to improve risk assessments and measures to prevent diversion. They should stimulate practical initiatives amongst interested governments and other ATT stakeholders. For example, it
would be useful to pool information and resources to address particular challenges for risk assessment or prevention; or to mobilise joint actions to identify and address weaknesses or gaps in national control systems associated with diversion risks. Once launched, the relevant Working Groups and CSP 2019 can review such initiatives, and encourage wider participation where appropriate..

All states need to acknowledge that their own national control systems and practices have weaknesses that enable or contribute to diversion. Experience shows that it is not sufficient simply to have a comprehensive national control system in place. Those involved in diversion typically understand how to exploit vulnerabilities in each national control system, as well as weak links during international transfers. Every state needs to take action to better identify and prevent diversion.

Members of Control Arms have many practical suggestions. For example:

1) Interested governments should launch voluntary peer reviews of each others’ national systems for risk assessment and risk mitigation to prevent diversion, and the challenges they have experienced; and communicate lessons-learned to ATT stakeholders...

2) Working group intersessional meetings should consider useful and feasible initiatives to pool resources to increase information available for selected aspects of risk assessments, such as on reliability of safeguards on air or naval transportation routes in certain regions; or on stockpile security risks.

3) All states should provide updates to their Initial Reports describing recent measures they have taken to improve their ability to prevent diversion.

We would be happy to share further suggestions, on request.