



Summary Analysis of CSP 2018 Working Group Meetings

Geneva, Switzerland

29 May - 1 June 2018

Executive Summary

A good level of engagement and substantive contributions facilitated progress in the efforts to support the Treaty implementation, universalization and transparency and reporting at the second set of Working Group Meetings and CSP 2018 Preparatory Conference, which took place in Geneva on 28 May - 01 June.

The meetings of the Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation had three sub-meetings with facilitators focused on Articles 11 on diversion, Articles 6 and 7, and Article 5 on general implementation. A number of states, including Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Côte d'Ivoire shared concrete experiences, case studies and practical measures related to the implementation and compliance with these obligations. This type of exchange of information will inform future discussions on the implementation of Articles 5 and 11 and will help in the development of good practices. States were less forthcoming in sharing concrete experiences with the implementation of Article 6 and 7 and the associated risk assessment and focused more on the development of guidance documents. General concern over reporting rates guided the discussions in the Working Group on Transparency and Reporting, with many states supporting the development of documents that would assist states to fulfill their reporting obligations. A short joint session of the three working groups explored ways forward in strengthening the linkages between the ATT and the Sustainable Development Goals, but there are no concrete proposals thus far.

The second CSP 2018 Preparatory Meeting discussed, in addition to the reports back from the three working groups, progress made on the implementations taken at the third CSP, the Voluntary Trust Fund, including the proposals approved for funding in 2018, and the development of the CSP 2018 provisional agenda and program of work. Some disagreement was expressed by states during the review of ATT approach to regional representation, particularly as it pertains to membership in the Management Committee.

Japan announced that continuing with the practice initiated by Finland last year, where the third CSP had a thematic focus on the Sustainable Development Goals, diversion will be the CSP's

thematic focus for this year. Hotel Chinzanso Tokyo was also formally announced as the venue for the fourth CSP.

Throughout the week, two well-received side-events discussed ATT implementation activities around the world and international assistance and cooperation to implement the ATT.

Control Arms had a delegation of 17 civil society delegates from six regions.

**Working Group on Effective Arms Trade Treaty Implementation (WGETI)
29 - 30 May 2018**

This year's WGETI was divided into three subgroups, in order to achieve more concrete outcomes. Each subgroup explored in detail the implementation of core ATT Articles 5, 6, 7 and 11.

Subgroup on Article 11 - Diversion

The discussions at the sub-working group on Article 11 were guided by its [Work Plan](#) which sought to take forward the decisions and key interest issues identified by the sub-group at the 06 March meeting. Facilitated by Tina Mathewson of Australia, the sub-working group discussed:

1. Where and how diversion is occurring
2. Measures to prevent and address diversion
3. Mechanisms for exchanging information

The sub-working group began with expert presentations on diversion. Robert Perkins of Conflict Armament Research (CAR), an investigative organisation that tracks the supply of arms, ammunition and explosive components into conflict-affected areas, provided a brief presentation which highlighted common types of diversion, including inadequate stockpile management, state collapse, battlefield capture, state-sponsored diversion and unauthorised re-transfer of weapons. In his presentation, Perkins also noted that if effectively implemented, the provisions in Article 11 as well as those related to record-keeping, brokering controls, customs and border cooperation and information-sharing, and capacity building for PSSM (physical security and stockpile management) could be critical in countering diversion.

Although many States acknowledged that diversion can take place at any stage in the life cycle/transfer chain of conventional arms, Costa Rica, Finland, Mexico, Spain and Switzerland highlighted challenges with preventing diversion post-delivery. In particular, Costa Rica shared information about a case of diversion within its borders where private security companies were involved in an illicit transfer of arms to a neighbouring country and explained how bilateral cooperation is enabling Costa Rica to address this issue.

Diversion during transfer was also highlighted by Mexico, which cautioned about “diversion through transborder postal companies.” Norway noted that freight companies must also do their due diligence while export control officials should look for any potential red flags and deviations from the norm in routes and other logistic information.

Stressing that “diversion of arms is enabled by, and depends on, secrecy”, Control Arms urged States Parties to make information publicly available in order to effectively communicate lessons learned. It also stressed the importance of fully implementing the obligations under Articles 2 through 11 and Article 14 in order to establish an effective national system for controlling transfers of conventional arms and for preventing their diversion.

Overall support was expressed for [Annex A](#) which proposes a non-exhaustive list of [Measures to Prevent and Address Diversion](#). Both Switzerland and Mexico however cautioned against listing ATT obligations in Annex A, as this document seeks to offer a non-exhaustive list of measures to prevent and address diversion and as such ATT obligations might be mistaken for optional measures. On a similar note, Belgium recommended taking the approach used in the Wassenaar document, where a distinction is made between mandatory elements and optional ones.

Finland raised the challenge of diversion of small arms, from hunting and sporting purposes to unauthorized end-uses. Similarly, Mexico, recognizing the right of civilians to possess arms in different countries, proposed that states also maintain national registries of civilians who are in possession of arms, along with their registries of exporters, freight forwarders/intermediate consignees, brokers, shipping agents, and end-users. Mexico also urged the facilitator to include Point 3 ([Performing consistent and objective transfer risk assessments that take into account the risk of diversion](#)) and Point 9 ([Not authorising the export if a significant risk of diversion is detected](#)) a recommendation for exporting states to verify that the arms transferred

will be kept in stockpile facilities and that they include this restriction in their end-user documentation.

Finland stressed the need to strengthen export controls for ammunition while ICRC recommended that States Parties apply the same diversion prevention measures to ammunition as they do to the arms themselves. These points received support from Mexico who called for the inclusion of a reference to ammunition in Annex A, while the United States cautioned that this would be a departure from the Treaty's provisions on ammunition.

During the brief discussion on [Annex B](#), both Belgium and [Control Arms](#) recommended expanding the list of guiding documents to include other resources.

During the discussions on mechanisms to exchange information, the EU stressed the need to include technical officials in these discussions, and Switzerland called for the involvement of National Points of Contact, particularly of licensing authorities. Mexico reminded states of its proposal for a mechanism for national experts to exchange confidential information and called for the re-inclusion of this point in the agenda.

The meeting of the subgroup on Article 11 concluded with recommendations from Japan, Sweden and Mexico to continue the work of this subgroup after the fourth CSP.

Subgroup on Articles 6 and 7 - Prohibitions, Export and Export Assessment

The discussions in the sub-working group on Articles 6 and 7 were guided by a [work plan](#) developed to move forward the interactive discussions from the 06 March meeting.

The sub-working group was facilitated by Daniel Nord of Sweden and discussed:

1. Experiences of implementing Articles 6 and 7
2. Examples of legal framework needed to implement Article 6.1
3. Draft guidance document on possible sources to be used for risk assessment under Articles 6 and 7
4. Gender-based violence in Article 7.4

Discussions on experiences of implementing Articles 6 and 7 opened with a [presentation](#) by Hidetaka Nishimura, Director, Security Trade Control Policy Division, Ministry of Economy, Trade

and Industry (METI) of Japan. The presentation, followed by a small number of questions from states, gave an overview of Japan's security export control system.

Discussions on Article 6.1 began with a presentation by Argentina on its national legislation to implement UNSC arms embargoes, providing an example of a legal framework that is needed to ensure the implementation of Article 6.1. [Control Arms stressed](#) that because the ATT is not at present robustly and universally implemented, there is still a clear need for embargoes. However it is becoming harder for the UNSC to agree to impose embargoes, even where the humanitarian need is obvious, such as in Syria, Israel, and Venezuela. It also stated that it is vital that ATT States Parties have the requisite legislation, regulations and other provisions in place in order to uphold UN embargoes. This needs to be considered a central element of their ATT implementation efforts.

Belgium commended the sub-group facilitator's efforts in compiling [Annex A](#) and noted the importance of having effective enforcement regimes as well as the key role played by transit and transshipment states in detecting arms embargoes violations and diversion. The list of sources in [Annex A](#) should reflect these additional points: panel reports, iTrace and EU sanctions map.

The Republic of Korea and Switzerland support the development of tools, guidance, best practice documentation and non-mandatory options for implementation of Articles 6 and 7. Switzerland suggested additions to the sources given in Annex B, including reports of fact-finding missions and formal inquiries. The ICRC suggested that the guidance document also include national diplomatic missions in recipient states, open and closed source information from other states procured through international cooperation, reports from recipient states from their own national reporting mechanisms and ATT annual reports as a guide for States Parties conducting risk assessments.

The Republic of Korea, Sweden and Belgium reminded states that sources presented in both Annexes A and B are references for states and not instructions to them. They do not place additional obligations on States Parties.

On [Annex B](#), which provides a list of sources to guide states in their risk assessment process under Article 6 and 7, Switzerland suggested the inclusion of mitigation and information sharing. Stressing the paramount importance of effective implementation of Articles 6 and 7, Control Arms

[welcomed](#) the draft guidance document but believed the sources of information could be expanded to include others such as the ICRC Practical Guide on Arms Transfer Decisions, the User's Guide to the EU Common Position on Arms Exports and the ATT Monitor or Saferworld's ATT Expert Group Reports.

Control Arms also highlighted arms transfers to Saudi Arabia that continue to fuel the conflict in Yemen, and called on exporters, including France and the UK, to share information on their risk assessment and risk mitigation measures. Control Arms urged those states that have changed their arms export policies to Saudi Arabia and its allies to share information and examples of exports that have been denied. This will help build understanding, good practice and norms around the implementation and compliance with Articles 6 and 7.

Ireland strongly supported efforts to define a focus for States Parties to implement their obligations under Article 7.4 on gender based violence. Ireland highlighted the link between Article 7.4 and SDGs 5 and 16, and referenced its [2017 Working Paper](#). GBV is underreported, and quantifiable indicators tend to be unreliable; nevertheless, those challenges should not impede States Parties' reflection on Article 7.4 and commitment under the women, peace and security agenda. GBV is *a/ways* a risk factor in emergencies and informed assessments by trained license officials are needed. Ireland also expressed support for the Control Arms research project on GBV.

The Control Arms practical guide will provide licensing officials with guidance on applying the GBV criteria in Article 7. This study includes violence that may constitute one of the crimes in Article 6, or serious violations of international law in Article 7.1. The study also includes crimes such as intimate partner violence and terrorism. As the study moves forward, Control Arms welcomes support and collaboration from states.

Sweden, facilitator of this sub-working group, reacted to Ireland's working paper, pointing out that 'serious' and 'overriding' terms are for Article 7, not just Article 7.4. There is a need to be wary of defining these terms for Article 7.4, as they are part of the broader work on Article 7. Sweden expressed similar concerns over Control Arms' proposed guidance document. Noting that many States Parties are currently working on implementing Article 7, Sweden proposed that the Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation should have more operative discussions on GBV risk assessment in the coming years, which could then develop into a guidance document.

Subgroup on Article 5 - General Implementation

The discussions on the implementation of Article 5, led by Leonard Tettey of Ghana and guided by the sub-group's [work plan](#), began with a brief report from the ATT Secretariat on the development of the National Points of Contacts Database. Mandated by the third CSP, this database will be maintained on a restricted section of the ATT Secretariat website. Unfortunately, only 49 of the 94 States Parties to the ATT have submitted the contact information for their National Points of Contact. The ATT Secretariat is also in the process of developing a guidance document with roles and tasks of National Points of Contact to be presented at the fourth CSP.

As the Wassenaar Agreement Munitions List and the EU Common Military List are used by many States Parties as points of reference in the development of their national control lists, Vincent Fleuriot, Senior Officer Control Lists at Wassenaar Agreement, offered an [overview of the Dual Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions Lists](#). He stressed that assessment is not always simple, even though the only selection criteria for the list is whether an item has been “specially designed or modified for military use”, whether it was designed to respond to battlefield requirements or is specific to military performance. Ongoing issues of concern for the Wassenaar Arrangement are forensics equipment; cyber threat, cyber warfare, cyber software targeting capacity of other side; drone (UAVs) jamming; and additive manufacturing (3D printing). The Centre for Armed Violence Reduction (CAVR) gave a presentation on control lists in the context of Pacific island governments.

There are no copyright issues for the Wassenaar lists and states are free to copy and adapt them into their own national control lists. The option of Model Legislation for National Control Lists was also discussed, with New Zealand noting that these lists can help provide common definitions for smaller states which do not have large arms transfers profiles.

[Costa Rica](#), [Jamaica](#) and [Cote d'Ivoire](#) shared their experiences with the implementation of Article 5 as states not falling into the category of traditional arms exporting states. Zamora of Costa Rica presented on her country's challenges and achievements of implementation of Article 5. She noted that the ATT is part of Costa Rica's foreign and national policy and the country's constitutional article 7 sets the ATT above national law. As a transit country in the trafficking of weapons and munitions, Costa Rica has seen an increase in violence in the region and stressed that the ATT could be a warrant of peace if it were effectively implemented. With support from the

VTF, Costa Rica worked towards strengthening information exchange and customs control between itself and Honduras, Panama and El Salvador. Costa Rica [shared](#) two cases of successful Article 5 implementation with the Working Group. One case involved an air transit with five stopovers planned and incorrect dates on documentation, therefore, Costa Rica blocked this air transit. A second case concerned a European country and a neighbouring country to Costa Rica and involved both a land transfer and an air transfer. The cargo arrived in Costa Rica without necessary documentation and Costa Rican officials stopped it. The ongoing challenges to Article 5 implementation in Costa Rica are legislation, improvement of national enforcement systems, preventing diversion and establishing stronger transit and transshipment controls.

Samantha Allen, Ministry of National Security, Jamaica, presented the challenges that small island developing states (SIDS) confront in implementing the ATT. Jamaica's porous and unprotected borders expose it to organized crime, illicit trafficking of small arms, parts and components, narcotics and high levels of crime and violence. Jamaica welcomes all initiatives to regulate the movement of SALW.

Allen listed several challenges that [Jamaica](#) faces in implementation of ATT Article 5. Firstly, the absence of legislation to specifically treat all articles of ATT, especially the establishment of national control lists. Secondly, there are deficiencies in national legislation on trans-shipment as per ATT Article 9. Thirdly, there is no established legislation or protocol for interagency cooperation. Fourthly, an absence of risk assessment supporting software platforms to support investigative and intelligence gathering and record keeping. Operationally, there is inadequate policing of borders, screening of cargo and detection training for officials.

Jamaica seeks to tackle these challenges by engaging with the international community to facilitate capacity building, strengthening its primary legislation governing firearms and by harmonizing national control lists with other legislation pertaining to the trade of strategic goods / dual-use items.

[Cote d'Ivoire](#) is a transit country for the sub-regional trade, sharing borders with 5 countries as well as a maritime border. Challenges to ATT implementation remain a major issue and lie largely in the harmonization of the regulatory framework. Cote d'Ivoire has reinforced the capacity of the security system and will organize a workshop to improve the capacity of the national security

commission. It also expressed its willingness to collaborate with neighbouring countries on the marking of weapons.

On the matter of national control systems (NCS), the facilitator mentioned the need to establish how much detail that NCS should contain as well as the need to define the process of who should be tasked to develop them. The EU welcomed a proposal to develop a guide to define NCS and offered assistance. Japan, the Netherlands and Belgium supported the idea of a welcome pack for States Parties. The ICRC said that consistency across countries is important and that national implementation measures should use objective indicators and take into account Articles 6, 7 and 11 when carrying out risk assessments.

[Control Arms](#) highlighted that some states with limited engagement with the international arms trade may feel overwhelmed by the requirements of Article 5. This is a particular issue for many ATT State Parties from the global South. ATT implementation capacity can build only through individual assessment and tailored capacity-building programmes. The outline in appendix B to the [work plan](#) for subgroup on Article 5 implementation is a good basis for a welcome pack. It would be useful if it were structured to address general Article 5 implementation issues and also particular sub-issues.

Serbia, New Zealand and USA cautioned on the careful use of language to avoid creating new obligations for States Parties. The UK expressed that Article 5 should be a priority for the VTF.

Working Group on Treaty Universalization (WGTU)

30 May 2018

The WGTU, co-chaired by Ambassador Klaus Korhonen of Finland and Ambassador Nobushige Takamizawa of Japan, was pleased that Chile is the 95th States Party to the ATT, and that Brazil and Cameroon will become States Parties in advance of the CSP 2018. Japan welcomed inputs in written form to the [discussion paper](#).

After the ATT Secretariat shared an overview on the [status of participation](#), the European Union noted that further work remains to be done among arms exporter states in the Middle East and in Asia. Universalisation of the ATT would make a contribution to human rights, peace and security.

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD) [presented its activities](#) in the field of conventional weapons. The Centre coordinates activities with ATT Secretariat to support accession and ratification efforts in 43 countries, only seven of which have become States Parties to the ATT.

The role of defence industry in the Treaty's universalization was highlighted in this Working Group and the Chair noted that partnership with industry is important to make progress on disarmament and arms control.

A presentation by Andrew Wood from AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) revealed that industry awareness of ATT is low but that there is support for high standards. Harmonized standards make it easier to develop industry-wide compliance programs, which provide predictability and assurances to businesses and in turn, reinforce measures to counter diversion. When asked by Chile about instances of misuse and what can be done to lessen the damage to the industry, Wood stressed the importance of having the right contractual framework and the ability to back out of a contract.

Similarly, the presentation by Rachel Stohl of the Stimson Centre revealed that US industry associations have generally supported the ATT and argued for its ratification which would provide transparency and predictability for industry. Under the current US administration, opportunities to discuss ATT openly have become less common. UK, Sweden and Australia said that they greatly value industry's role in the ATT context. Australia's universalization efforts include a [publication](#) launched last year on the benefits of the ATT, which includes a section specifically focused on the benefits for industry.

[Control Arms](#) expressed surprise that in spite of its extensive effort in universalization of the ATT, it was not included in the formal agenda of the Working Group. It also welcomed Canada's decision to become a State Party, but expressed concerns over its current plans to maintain a licensing and reporting exemption for transfers to Canada's largest defence trade partner, the United States. Control Arms hoped that Canada would address this loophole before becoming a State Party.

Mexico, Chile and New Zealand recognized civil society's contribution and efforts in support of the universalization of the Treaty.

Proposal for Troika system for ATT presidency

France and Italy proposed a formal troika system for the ATT presidency, comprising the past, current and future presidents of CSP. The troika system would allow coordination and continuity of approaches, and the current cooperation between past and current president testament to the benefits of this proposal.

The EU and UK support the troika proposal, with the UK seeking clarity on how the troika would be operationalized. Mexico and Costa Rica had reservations about the feasibility of this proposed troika if there is no rotation of chairmanship. France took note of the questions and will provide answers in due course.

ATT Implementation Efforts Around the World Side Event

Co-hosted by Control Arms, GCSP, Saferworld, SIPRI and the Government of Mexico, this side event highlighted examples of government and civil society partnerships, trainings and sharing of information in support of the Treaty's implementation across regions. Anna Macdonald, Chairing, noted that good partnership projects often have engagement at a range of levels and type of stakeholder; include a direct training element, as well as the provision of information and data sharing. Roy Isbister, Saferworld, shared information about Saferworld's expert group on ATT implementation which aims to facilitate informal exchanges between global and multi-stakeholder experts on salient issues to ATT. Guillaume Michel of the Permanent Mission of Mexico spoke about Control Arms' Latin America ATT Academy which held its first in-person training in Mexico and involved governmental officials and civil society representatives from six Latin American countries. He also shared discussions from a conference that Mexico convened with the governing bodies of several treaties, governments and civil society to explore ways to tackle diversion.

Shobha Shrestha, Founder of Women for Peace and Democracy - Nepal, shared outcomes from a 2-day roundtable held in Kathmandu on 17-18 May, "Promoting Universalization and Implementation of the ATT in South Asia". At this meeting, representatives from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka discussed common challenges surrounding universalization in the region and agreed to form a South Asia Coalition to

reinvigorate momentum for support of the Treaty. Kolja Brockmann of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) gave a tour of its [database on assistance activities](#) relevant to ATT. The database could help the ATT Secretariat to match offers and requests for assistance under Article 18 of the ATT. Marc Finaud of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy outlined the centre's courses for government officials and decision makers involved in implementation of the ATT. He emphasised the challenges of sometimes high levels of reporting requirements and administration among the two main funds, UNSCAR and VTF.

Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR)

31 May 2018

The discussions of the Working Group on Transparency and Reporting (WGTR), led by Co-Chairs Guillaume Michel of Mexico and Tom Nijs of Belgium, began with a presentation by ATT Secretariat on the [status of reporting](#) by States Parties. The ATT Secretariat noted the decline in the number of States Parties that have submitted annual and initial reports.

Co-Chair Belgium, Japan, and the Republic of Korea all expressed concern and regret at the decline in reporting by States Parties. The Republic of Korea, the Netherlands and Costa Rica emphasized that reporting is crucial to promoting transparency and, along with United Kingdom, support efforts to implement the ATT by supporting States Parties in reporting. The United States also stated that reporting is an essential obligation of the ATT.

South Africa, Mexico, and Belgium believe more work can be done by the WGTR to promote reporting. Belgium's suggestions include a 'Document of National Measures' that help States Parties organize their information and develop better reporting practices, as well as a mechanism through which States Parties can inform the reasons why they are not submitting reports on time. Both Republic of Korea and the United States highlighted that there are no mechanisms through which reporting is enforced.

In order to address challenges in reporting, Mexico suggested a FAQ document, a focus on outreach due to the lack of understanding of the importance of reporting, organized gatherings of civil society and governments at a regional level, and a more active role for the ATT Secretariat. Support for the FAQ document came from Mexico and the United Kingdom. Support for increased

outreach came from Mexico, the United Kingdom and Control Arms, with particular emphasis on subregional approaches. Mexico mentioned the possibility of a calendar of regional workshops to help States Parties submit reports on time. Both Co-Chairs also felt it was a good idea to consider VTF funds for this purpose.

Mexico highlighted suggestions from Control Arms and Madagascar on how to concretely support States Parties in need of assistance with reporting: giving the Secretariat a reporting mandate; listing existing guidance tools; compiling a roster of reporting experts; and providing a forum within an ATT IT platform for intersessional exchanges on reporting. Switzerland, Japan, Finland and South Africa all expressed concern that a reporting mandate for the Secretariat could place demands on its capacity. All supported the suggestion but wanted more discussion on what kind of assistance the Secretariat would give. Control Arms suggested increasing capacity and pointed out that CA members have experience in identifying challenges in reporting.

The discussion on substantive reporting and transparency issues opened with a presentation from [the World Custom Organization \(WCO\) and the Harmonized System](#). The Netherlands, Switzerland and Romania shared challenges they face when fulfilling reporting obligations. CAVR introduced a technological assistance project to help overcome challenges related to data collection. The Stimson Center provided a comprehensive list of challenges States Parties have reported in their surveys, as well as the suggestion that the synergies between different mandatory reporting be taken to create a common line interface for UN Register and ATT reports.

Japan opened the discussion on organizational means for information exchange by suggesting the following go on the Secretariat website: national points of contact, information related to diversion including best practise and links to helpful documents. Italy and Australia both emphasized the need for information exchange related to diversion. Italy and Romania supported Japan's proposal, and the Netherlands, Australia and the United States were supportive, but wanted more discussion.

The Stimson Center highlighted the Baseline Assessment project as a tool for harnessing information generated by mandatory reporting. Control Arms supported the harnessing of information generated by mandatory reporting in a searchable online database to enhance the value of the reporting mechanisms under the ATT, by facilitating information exchange and lesson-learning.

“International assistance and cooperation to implement the ATT” Side Event

Examples of the [Voluntary Trust Fund](#) (VTF), European Union ATT outreach assistance project and Small Arms Survey ACCESS project

At a side event organized on 31 May by Small Arms Survey, Ambassador Takamizawa of Japan stressed that raising awareness of VTF in the Asian region is an important mission for Japan, which contributed USD 3m to the fund, hoping to highlight the significance of ATT implementation. Colonel Bruno Paulus, Military Advisor, Mission of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament explained more about the VTF and how States can apply for funding.

Caroline Cliff, Chair of the Council Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM), European External Action Service, presented the ATT outreach programme funded by the EU and its challenges and learning outcomes. Paul Holtom, Senior Researcher, Small Arms Survey, presented the Arms Control, Capacity, and Evaluation Support System (ACCESS) project. The aim is to build capacity to identify priorities and develop strategic plans to put in place measures to strengthen conventional arms controls at the national, sub-regional and regional level, especially in Africa.

Joint Session of the ATT Working Groups on the SDGs

1 June 2018

The Joint Session of the ATT Working Groups on the SDGs, chaired by Ambassador Klaus Korhonen of Finland, opened with a presentation by Anna Alvazzi del Frate, Director of Programmes, Small Arms Survey (SAS). The SDGs, which are mutually independent, represent a great opportunity to strengthen and multiply the effects of all agendas, including prevention of violence, arms control and women and peace. They also present an opportunity for unusual possible partnerships with different stakeholders. The specific connection to arms issues is with Target 16.4, whereby states commit to reduce arms flows. Two narratives were presented. First, better arms control reduces the risk of diversion, which means less violence and insecurity. Second, implementation of Articles 5, 6-10, and 11 of the ATT, developing national systems to regulate transfers and prevent diversion, ensures that international transfers are responsible and reduce human suffering.

After the presentation, the Chairs of the Working Groups highlighted parallels between the mandate of each of the working groups and the SDGs.

Ambassador Sabrina Dallafor of Switzerland, Co-Chair of the WGETI, mentioned the UNSG's disarmament agenda. There was broad consensus that it should be moved forward, but questions still remain on how to proceed. The links between the ATT and SDGs help inform this conversation. ATT Article 11 provides a clear and direct link with SDG 16.4. Under the guidance of Australia, the Article 11 sub-group will explore these questions in greater detail, including the different stages of diversion and ways to strengthen institutions. Further links between the ATT and SDGs were mentioned, including between Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT and the SDGs 11.4 (cultural heritage), 16.5 (corruption and bribery) and 5.2 (GBV). However, a lot remains to be done in this area. Small Arms Survey for instance, [highlighted](#) the synergies between ATT Article 5 and the SDG 16.6 (institutions), 16.7 (decision making), and 5.5 (women's participation in decision making). Switzerland noted its plans for a thematic approach at this year's High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF 2019) focusing on SDG 16.

WGTR Chair Guillaume Michel highlighted the working group's discussions on enhancing compliance with reporting obligations, and linked this objective with the SDGs, specifically SDGs 16.4, 16.5 (corruption) and 16.6 (institutions). He also noted that to further ATT implementation, specific indicators on the SDG agenda can be included. SDGs have a timeline for implementation, and the ATT will continue beyond that. The SDGs must be seen as a benchmark for the implementation of the ATT.

The Chair of the universalization working group stated that the goal of universalization is parallel to SDGs, as universalization is the most powerful instrument to combating the illicit trade of arms. Ambassador Takamizawa highlighted the echoes of reducing human suffering in SDG 16.1, as well as universalization as a tool in moving forward SDG 16.4. Furthermore, the link between the work of the WGTU and SDG 17.7 was highlighted in the mobilization of additional financial resources to increase North-South cooperation.

Ambassador Yvette Stevens of Sierra Leone began the general discussion with reference to her SDG presentation from CSP3. She emphasized that implementation of the SDGs will be done on a national level, and concerted efforts need to be made to incorporate ATT voices into national

programmes. Clear messages on how to do this can be promulgated at regional and subregional meetings. Many states echoed the strong links between SDGs and the arms trade, and Switzerland mentioned specifically the consequences related to arms control transfers. Germany and Mexico both highlighted the need for effective implementation of the ATT in order to work towards the SDGs. For Mexico, this means a need for international cooperation, a point also made by Costa Rica, who supports cooperation between civil society, government and business in order to achieve these goals. Germany called attention to the use of the VTF as a flexible fund to support implementation of the ATT and encouraged States Parties to submit innovative proposals for projects that support SDG implementation of ATT provisions. Japan mentioned continuity of this thematic discussion at CSP4.