As the multi-year work plan moves toward completion and States Parties consider what lies ahead, Control Arms suggests prioritizing information exchange between States Parties. Through interactive discussions, States Parties can listen and learn directly from their peers about their specific experiences with risk assessment, transit and transshipment, and diversion.

We support the designation of the Voluntary Guide Chapter 1 “Key Concepts” as a “work in progress” as set out in paragraph 22 of the Report of the WGETI. However, we note that this designation is not carried through to paragraph 37(a), which instead requests that the chapter is marked “completed.”

We encourage the Chair to harmonize this language so that the recommendation maintains the designation "work in progress." In doing so, new States Parties – and those struggling to engage during the COVID-19 pandemic – can share “key concept” submissions at a later point.

And we suggest that only once the drafting for all chapters is complete should the Voluntary Guide be endorsed by the Conference.

Mr. Chair, we welcome the effort made by the sub-working groups on Articles 9 and 11 to develop resources that can practically assist states to implement the Treaty. We encourage states to actively engage in the sessions of these sub-working groups, and support continued dialogue exploring real-world examples of linkages between transit and transhipment and diversion mitigation.

We see the current draft of the President’s paper on post-shipment cooperation as the starting point for a detailed and substantive conversation during CSP9. We encourage the delineation of ways in which conversations in the DIEF could be leveraged and shared with the sub-Working Group on Article 11 to maximise their value for officials and states not present for those closed discussions.

Mr. Chair

Today, an unprecedented volume of weapons are being transferred to Ukraine. This has led to concern regarding the potential diversion of such arms, either to illegitimate end-users within the conflict or to the wider region. Certain states providing military aid are reportedly exploring steps to monitor and potentially mitigate these diversion risks, even as hostilities continue. In time, this information could help determine the effectiveness of these strategies in preventing diversion in the Ukrainian context, and may serve to strengthen the overall guidance developed under Article 11.

Thank you Mr Chair.